Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” While he referred primarily to armed conflict, political competition can also continue through methods other than direct military confrontation. Proxy wars, economic sanctions, cyber operations, and information campaigns have become central instruments of modern statecraft, reducing the relative importance of conventional military force alone. Although governments often rely on coercive power to maintain authority, history offers numerous examples of regimes that attempted to preserve their rule through repression, only to collapse violently or be replaced by another authoritarian system.
Russia provides several notable examples of this pattern. From the power struggles of the Tsarist era to the Bolshevik Revolution and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union, political authority has repeatedly been reshaped through periods of instability and upheaval. The war in Ukraine also illustrates how initial expectations can differ dramatically from reality. What some commentators initially predicted would be a swift Russian victory has instead evolved into a prolonged war of attrition that has lasted for years. Even analysts who expected Russia to prevail have increasingly acknowledged that the conflict has imposed substantial military, economic, and political costs.
Describing those costs as merely giving Russia a “bloody nose” no longer captures the scale of the challenges facing the country, according to this perspective. Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries and fuel storage facilities have disrupted parts of Russia’s energy infrastructure, placing pressure on export revenues and domestic fuel supplies. At the same time, sustaining the war has intensified fiscal strains on a system already burdened by extensive state spending, subsidies, and entrenched corruption. Politically, criticism of President Vladimir Putin has emerged from some figures traditionally associated with the Russian establishment, focusing on the conduct of the war, domestic governance, and restrictions on free expression. In addition, reports of arrests and the use of coercive measures against certain former allies have fueled comparisons with earlier periods of Soviet-style political repression.
What Is Actually Happening?
The developments discussed below do not necessarily indicate that the Russian government is on the verge of collapse. Regime change remains uncertain and difficult to predict. However, there are signs that divisions among political and economic elites are becoming more pronounced, a trend that could continue if the war remains locked in a prolonged stalemate. Such a scenario presents growing challenges for Russia, particularly as battlefield losses remain high. Reports suggest that monthly casualties continue at a substantial pace, and some analysts argue that losses have, at times, outstripped the rate at which new personnel are recruited.
Conditions on the domestic front have also become more complicated. While Russia recorded economic growth between 2022 and 2024, many economists argue that much of this expansion was driven by extraordinary levels of military spending rather than broad-based economic strength. As a result, concerns have grown that the economy could slow significantly or even enter recession once wartime spending becomes harder to sustain.
Inflation has not been evenly distributed across the country. Major urban centers such as Moscow and St. Petersburg have generally experienced more moderate price increases, while many rural and less-developed regions have faced considerably higher inflation. Some analysts also argue that official economic statistics may not fully reflect the extent of regional disparities or underlying structural weaknesses.
The financial burden of the war may extend well beyond officially reported defense expenditures. Although estimates often cite Russia spending roughly 8 percent of GDP—or around 40 percent of the federal budget—on defense and military operations, critics argue that these figures overlook the indirect costs of sustaining sanctioned industries. Large portions of Russia's economy rely on commodity exports and industrial enterprises that have faced significant pressure from international sanctions and shifting export markets. Many of these industries depend heavily on state assistance to remain operational, particularly those built around aging Soviet-era infrastructure or located in remote mono-industrial towns. As a result, the overall economic cost of the war may include not only military spending but also extensive subsidies required to support affected sectors.
Fiscal pressures have become increasingly evident as government spending has risen sharply. Russia has recorded large budget deficits, prompting officials to consider reducing expenditures in areas unrelated to defense. If civilian spending is reduced, many regions outside the Moscow–St. Petersburg metropolitan area could receive less federal support.
This issue is particularly significant because Russia has historically relied on strong fiscal ties between the central government and its regions. Throughout the Tsarist, Soviet, and modern eras, federal funding has played an important role in maintaining political stability and regional loyalty. Some analysts argue that sustained reductions in financial support—especially for economically dependent or ethnically distinct regions—could increase political tensions and complicate the government's efforts to preserve cohesion across the federation.
All of these pressures are unfolding while Ukraine continues striking Russian logistics hubs, air-defense systems, and energy infrastructure, including oil production, refining, and storage facilities. According to many analysts, these attacks have disrupted fuel distribution, forced Russia to increase imports of certain petroleum products, and reduced profit margins on oil exports that help finance the war. Some military observers also argue that Ukraine has significantly weakened parts of Russia’s air-defense network and degraded several specialized drone units that had previously contributed to Russian battlefield advantages. If these assessments are accurate, they suggest the conflict is becoming an increasingly costly war of attrition for both sides, with mounting losses for Russia as well.
The System Putin Built
Alongside the Kremlin’s messaging about defending the “Holy Rus’” and combating “Ukrainian Nazis,” there have been reports of growing frustration among some members of Russia’s political and economic elite. While public criticism remains rare because of strict political controls, isolated cases suggest that dissatisfaction is not directed solely at Ukraine or the West but, in some instances, at the Russian government and even President Vladimir Putin himself.
One example frequently cited is that of pro-Kremlin activist Ilya Remeslo, who was reportedly detained in a psychiatric institution after publishing statements sharply criticizing Putin over the course of the war and describing his leadership in highly negative terms. Remeslo had previously been known as a strong supporter of the Kremlin and for his legal actions against the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, making his reported criticism particularly noteworthy to some observers.
Even so, Remeslo represents only one voice within a much larger political system. Broader debates have emerged over specific government policies, including proposals affecting Telegram, which reportedly drew criticism from parts of the public and some political figures. Although such criticism was often directed at unnamed officials rather than Putin personally, it nevertheless reflected unease over certain government decisions. Reports have also pointed to growing concern among some politicians and business elites about the long-term costs of the war, as well as occasional discussions involving Ukrainian representatives and businessman Roman Abramovich regarding humanitarian or diplomatic matters.
From the outside, Russia is sometimes portrayed as a politically unified state with a single ideological direction. In reality, many analysts argue that the country's political landscape is more complex. While support for restoring Russia’s influence is a common theme among many factions, they differ significantly in ideology, priorities, and preferred methods. The turbulent transition following the collapse of the Soviet Union, together with the uneven economic reforms of the 1990s, contributed to the rise of a wide range of nationalist, imperial, socialist, and other political movements.
Over time, the Putin government has sought to consolidate these diverse currents under a centralized political system. As a result, groups that once held sharply conflicting views—including organizations inspired by Soviet nostalgia, Tsarist symbolism, or ultranationalist ideas—have, in various ways, been incorporated into or aligned with the broader state apparatus. According to many scholars of Russian politics, this strategy has reduced open rivalry among these factions while allowing the Kremlin to maintain tighter control over the country's political landscape.
This dynamic also extends to Russia’s oligarchs, senior bureaucrats, and security services, each of which has its own interests and internal rivalries. Putin’s political system has long depended on balancing these powerful groups, whose influence and financial resources have been essential to maintaining his authority. Analysts have noted that these elites are not a unified bloc; they often compete with one another and, at times, have pushed back against Kremlin policies, including proposed pension and welfare reforms. Recent legal cases involving businessman Ilya Traber and several associates have also renewed attention to the long-standing relationships between influential business figures, organized crime networks, and the Russian state during the post-Soviet period. As the financial burden of the war grows, reports of increased pressure on wealthy business leaders to make “voluntary” contributions, together with state seizures of major private assets, have further strained relations between the Kremlin and parts of the economic elite.
Taken together, these developments do not necessarily suggest that Russia is approaching imminent state collapse. However, they do point to growing pressures on the cohesion of the political system. While large-scale public protests remain unlikely under current conditions, prolonged war, economic strain, and battlefield losses may gradually weaken support among some of the constituencies that have traditionally backed Putin. Reports of dissatisfaction among soldiers, including isolated cases in which servicemen have publicly complained about their treatment and leadership, illustrate some of these underlying tensions.
Russia also faces limits in the support it can expect from its international partners. North Korea has provided military assistance, but its ability to significantly alter the course of the conflict is widely viewed as limited. China, meanwhile, has maintained a more cautious and pragmatic approach. Beijing has strong incentives to preserve its strategic relationship with Moscow while simultaneously pursuing its own economic interests. This includes negotiating favorable energy deals, purchasing Russian commodities at discounted prices, and maintaining commercial relationships that maximize China's leverage. Analysts have also noted that Chinese firms have been accused of supplying dual-use goods and critical components that can indirectly support both sides of the conflict through third-party intermediaries.
From this perspective, Putin has not created a fully unified Russian society but rather a political system increasingly burdened by the cumulative costs of war. Over more than two decades in power, he has positioned himself as the central figure of Russian politics, leaving few widely accepted successors or alternative centers of authority. At the same time, Russia's political landscape remains divided among competing nationalist, imperial, pragmatic, and ideological factions whose long-term visions for the country's future often conflict. Intensified wartime propaganda since 2022 has further heightened public expectations and increased pressure on the government to deliver military and political success.
Although an immediate change of government remains unlikely, some observers argue that the greater long-term risk lies in what could follow if the existing system were to weaken suddenly. They draw historical comparisons to cases in which the removal of a dominant leader created prolonged instability rather than a smooth political transition. One frequently cited example is the 1963 overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, after which successive governments struggled to establish stability amid continuing conflict. By analogy, analysts caution that, because Russia lacks a broadly accepted alternative leadership and contains multiple well-organized factions with competing interests, any abrupt disruption to the current political order could increase the risk of internal instability. For the foreseeable future, however, the war itself continues to impose enormous human and economic costs on both Russia and Ukraine.
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